The Vedanta Sutras, commentary by Sankaracharya (SBE34), tr. by George Thibaut [1890] at sacred-texts.com
9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pradhâna) being devoid of the power of intelligence.
But--the Sânkhya resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gunas to be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the characteristics of the gunas from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible. Now the gunas are admitted to be of an unsteady nature; hence the gunas themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.
Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, &c., remain in force on account of the pradhâna being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sânkhya should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedântic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover, if the gunas were capable of entering into the relation of mutual inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two
things would happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before 1.
376:1 Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpâdâyogah. Ân. Gi.