The Vedanta Sutras, commentary by Sankaracharya (SBE34), tr. by George Thibaut [1890] at sacred-texts.com
18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).
The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the
[paragraph continues] Vaiseshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic 1). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.
That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists, sarvâstitvavâdin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, vigñânavâdin); and the opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists, sûnyavâdin 2).--We first controvert those
who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (bhûta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either mind (kitta) or mental (kaitta). The elements are earth, water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.--The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rûpaskandha), the group of knowledge (vigñânaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanâskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samgñâskandha), and the group of impressions (samskâraskandha) 1; which
taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence 1.
With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.--Those two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Bauddha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhigvalana) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously 2. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active 3. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the âlayavigñâna-pravâha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedântins; or non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms 4.
[paragraph continues] (And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.)--For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.
401:1 Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.
401:2 The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the Sankarabhâshya, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadarsanasamgraha.--The Nihilists are the Mâdhyamikas; the Idealists are the Yogâkâras; the Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâshikas together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brahmavidyâbharana.--Buddhasya hi mâdhyamika-yogâkâra-sautrântika-vaibhâshikasamgñakâs katvârah sishyâh. Tatra buddhena prathamam yân prati sarvam sûnyam ity upadishtam te mâdhyamikâs te hi gurunâ yathoktam tathaiva sraddhayâ grihîtavanta iti kritvâ nâpakrishtâh punas ka taduktasyârthasya buddhyanusârenâkshepasyâkritatvân notkrishtabuddhaya iti mâdhyamikâh. Anyais tu sishyair gurunâ sarvasûnyatva upadishte gñânâtiriktasya sarvasya sûnyatvam astu nâmeti gurûktir yoga iti bauddaih paribhâshitopetâh tad upari ka gñânasya tu sûnyatvam na sambhavati tathâtve gagadândhyaprasangât sûnyasiddher apy asambhavâk keti buddhamate âkâratvena paribhâshita âkshepo#pi krita iti yogâkârâh vigñânamâtrâstitvavâdinah. Tadanataram anyaih sishyaih p. 402 pratîtisiddhasya katham sûnyatvam vaktum sakyam ato gñânavad vâhyârtho#pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva so#stu, param tu so #numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathângîkrityaivam sishyamatim anusritya kiyatparyantam sûtram bhavishyatîti taih prishtam atas te sautrântikâh. Anye punar yady ayam ghata iti pratîtibalâd vâhyo#rtha upeyate tarhi tasyâ eva pratîter aparokshatvât sa katham paroksho#to vâhyo#rtho na pratyaksha iti bhâshâ viruddhety âkshipann atas te vaibhâshikâh.
402:1 The rûpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as kaittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as kaittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses.--The vigñânaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity âlayavgñânapravâhah), according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyâbharana, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpakam nirvikalpakam ka pravrittivigñânasamgñitam).--The vedanâskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samgñâskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur asva ityâdisabdasamgalpitapratyayah, Ân. Gi.; gaur asva ityevam nâmavisishtasavikalpakah pratyayah, Go. Ân.; samgñâ yagñadattâdipadatadullekhî savikalpapratyayo vâ, dvitîyapakshe vigñânapadena savikalpapratyayo na grâhyah, Brahmavidyâbh.). The samskâraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and adharma.--Compare also the Bhâmatî.--The vigñânaskandha is kitta, the other skandhas kaitta.
403:1 It has to be kept in view that the sarvâstitvavâdins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (kshanikatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.
403:2 Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.
403:3 In consequence of which no release could take place.
403:4 The Brahmavidyâbharana explains the last clause--from kshanikatvâk ka--somewhat differently: Api ka paramânûnâm api kshanikatvâbhyupagamân melanam na sambhavati, paramânûnâm melanam paramânukriyâdhînam, tathâ ka svakriyâm prati paramânûnâm kâranatvât kriyâpûrakshane paramânubhir bhâvyam kriyâ p. 404 srayatayâ kriyâkshane#pi teshâm avasthânam apekshitam evam melanakshane#pi, nahi melanâsrayasyâbhâve melanarûpâ pravrittir upapadyate, tathâ ka sthiraparamânusâdhyâ melanarûpâ pravrittih katham teshâm kshanikatve bhavet.--Ânanda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.